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Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core partition. Several conditions
guaranteeing the existence of core partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced
family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its
set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution.
Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision.With
subordinationwehave a tool, within hedonic games, to compare howa “convenient” agreement reached by the sets of representatives
of different groups of a society is “valued” by the rest of the society. In our approach, a “convenient” agreement is a core partition,
so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives.
Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those
prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives.We also study how a distribution determines thewhole set of core partitions
of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning
games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is
later used to provide a nonconstructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.
1. Introduction
Coalitional games are models which take into account the
interaction between the players of the game. In general, any
subgroup of players (a coalition) can influence the result of
the game. However, it has been recognized that, sometimes,
some of the coalitions can completely determine the devel-
opment of the game. In their seminal paper, Kaneko and
Wooders [1] introduce the class of partitioning games as a way
to capture the fact that “In an 𝑛-cooperative game it may not
be equally easy to formevery coalition.” In those games, only a
subset of coalitions play such an essential role that determines
the behavior of all the other coalitions. This characteristic
is shared for several of the games studied in the literature
such as the marriage game [2], the bridge game [3], the
assignment game [4], and the m-sided assignment game [5]
among others. Kaneko andWooders [1] present a transferable
utility version for partitioning games and a nontransferable
utility version as well and focus on the nonemptiness of the
core of the games. As a key contribution, they provide a list
of necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize a class
of families of coalitions under which any possible induced
partitioning game has nonempty core, a property motivated
by the behavior exhibited by the assignment game. We point
out that the essential coalitions in the well-known marriage
game of Gale and Shapley [2] satisfy those conditions,
although none of the versions of the games presented by
Kaneko and Wooders [1] suit well to deal with the existence
of a stable matching. Hedonic games [6, 7], which constitute
another class of games, have received considerable attention
in the last decade and seem to be more appropriate to deal
with matching problems than coalitional games where a
utility is present. A hedonic games (𝑁, ⪰) is a simple model
of coalition formation determined by a set of 𝑛 players 𝑁
and a profile of preferences ⪰= (⪰1, . . . , ⪰𝑛) where, for any𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛, ⪰𝑖 is an ordering of the coalitions containing
player 𝑖. The main solution concept for a hedonic game is
that of core partition, namely, a partition of the set of players
that is resistant to a certain class of objections raised by the
coalitions in the game (Section 2).There are several sufficient
2 GameTheory
conditions for the existence of core partitions, being those
of top-coalition properties [6], consecutiveness, and ordinal
balancedness [7] among themost well known. Iehle´ [8] gives a
complete answer to the existence problem in a general setting
by introducing the notion of pivotal balancedness. To define
pivotal balancedness first it is associated one of its subsets
to each coalition 𝑆. Iehle´ [8] calls this family of subsets a
distribution. Iehle´’s condition states that a hedonic game has
nonempty core if and only if there is a distribution such that
the game is pivotally balancedwith respect to this distribution
(see Section 2). Thus, checking this condition is a two-step
procedure. First, a distribution has to be considered, and
then, the balancedness condition has to be verified.
On the other hand, in many situations, different groups
in a society choose a subgroup to act as their representatives.
Then, the agreements (if any) reached by the groups of
representatives are imposed, one way or the other, to the
whole society. An interesting issue is whether a “convenient”
agreement for the representatives is also good for the rest
of the society. With this idea in mind, we note that a set of
representatives for a coalition 𝑆 can be taken as an element
I(𝑆) of a distribution I, a relation that builds a bridge
between our objective and a well-developed mathematical
framework. We also point out that, although the notion
of pivotally balancedness works very well to deal with the
general existence problem of core partitions in hedonic
games, it does not reflect towhich extent a family of coalitions
of representatives determines the behavior of the game. For
instance, if a family I of coalitions of representatives (a
distribution) plays a reduced game where the only admissible
coalitions are those in I, an interesting issue is to look for
relationships, if any, between the cores of both games. For
instance, if 𝜋 is a core partition in the reduced game (an
agreement between the groups of representatives), is also 𝜋 a
core partition (a good agreement for the whole society) in the
original game? Answers to this problem could help, at least,
in two dimensions to the treatment of hedonic games. First,
since we start with a distribution, the first step in the two-step
procedure mentioned above is simplified. Second, in order
to get core partitions in the original game, one can solve a
reduced and possibly simpler game.
Unfortunately, as several examples show, there are no
general results. What is missing is the description of some
connection, apart from inclusion, between a coalition and its
set of representatives. To tackle this point, we appeal to the
notion of a hedonic game subordinated to a distribution. In
order to deal with the reduced game played by the coalitions
of representatives we present some results about a hedonic
game with a restricted family of admissible coalitions. They
are simple extensions of the main existence results proved
by Iehle´ [8]. Pa´pai [9] has already used the idea of restrict
the family of feasible coalitions to get uniqueness results
about core partitions in hedonic games, while the idea of
subordination (Section 3) seems to be new. Subordination
in a game (𝑁, ⪰) roughly states that any player chosen as a
representative of a coalition has to be comfortable with this
decision. This is formalized by asking that ifI(𝑆) stands for
the set of representatives of a coalition 𝑆, thenI(𝑆)⪰𝑖𝑆 for any𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆). Subordination involves some degree of anonymity
on the individual preferences, although it is weaker than the
common ranking property [10] or the top-coalition condition
[6].When subordination is present, a balancedness condition
has to be checked only on the family of representatives to
guarantee the existence of core partitions. Moreover, under
mild additional conditions, the family of representatives
determines completely the core of the hedonic game.
The organization of the paper is as the following. In the
next section, we present our version of hedonic games where
some restrictions on the family of admissible coalitions are
imposed. They are a straightforward extension of hedonic
games as stated by Banerjee et al. [6] and Bogomolnaia
and Jackson [7] where there is no restriction on the family
of admissible coalitions. For this enlarged class of hedonic
games we state two balancedness conditions extending those
of ordinal balancedness of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [7] and
pivotal balancedness of Iehle´ [8]. Following those authors,
we show that both conditions are sufficient to guarantee
the existence of core partitions, while pivotal balancedness
is also a necessary condition. In Section 3 we study the
issue of subordination.The idea behind subordination is that,
given a reduced family of coalitions, along with a profile of
preferences, there are games whose core behavior is deter-
mined by this basic information. We state some sufficient
conditions to guarantee the existence of core partitions and to
guarantee that the core of the whole game is fully determined
by the basic information given on a reduced family of
coalition as well. Several examples and counter examples
are also shown there. In Section 4 we relate subordination
to other sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of
core partitions in hedonic games like top-coalition properties
[6] and consecutiveness [7]. At the end of this section, we
introduce the notion of partitioning hedonic game. They
always have a family of essential coalitions associated, and we
prove that every partitioning game has nonempty core if the
family of essential coalitions satisfies either condition (ii) or
the equivalent condition (iii) of Theorem 2.7 of Kaneko and
Wooders [1]. We use the results about hedonic partitioning
games to elaborate a nonconstructive proof of the existence
of a stable matching in the marriage game [2] different
from the proof provided by Sotomayor [11]. To this end,
we associate a partitioning hedonic game to each marriage
problem, so that results in Section 4 can be used. We include
a final Appendix where we sketch the existence proof of
core partitions in hedonic games with a restricted family of
admissible coalitions very similar to that ofTheorem3of Iehle´
[8].
2. Hedonic Games
To define a hedonic game, we start with a nonempty finite
set𝑁 = {1, . . . , 𝑛}, the players, and its familyN of nonempty
subsets, the coalitions. Given any family of coalitionsA ⊆N
and a player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, we denote by A(𝑖) the subfamily of
coalitions in A containing player 𝑖. A hedonic game is a 3-
tuple (𝑁, ⪰̂;A), where A ⊆ N is a nonempty family and⪰̂ = (⪰̂𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 is a preference profile with ⪰̂𝑖, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,
being a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on
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A(𝑖). For any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ≻̂𝑖 will stand for the strict preference
relation related to ⪰̂𝑖 (𝑆≻̂𝑖𝑇 if and only if 𝑆⪰̂𝑖𝑇 but not 𝑇⪰̂𝑖𝑆).
PA(𝑁) will denote the family of partitions 𝜋 = {𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑠}
of 𝑁 such that 𝜋𝑗 ∈ A for any 𝑗 = 1, . . . 𝑠. Given 𝜋 ={𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑠} ∈ PA(𝑁) and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜋(𝑖) will denote the unique
set in 𝜋 containing player 𝑖.
Given a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) and 𝜋 ∈ PA(𝑁), we
say that 𝑇 ∈ A blocks 𝜋 if, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑇≻̂𝑖𝜋(𝑖). The core𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is the set of partitions in PA(𝑁)
blocked by no coalition. In a game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A),A is the family
of admissible coalitions.Themost studied case in the literature
isA = N, namely, when there is no restriction on the set of
admissible coalitions (see, e.g., [6–8]). When this is the case,
we will omitA from all the notation, and we will use ⪰𝑖 (≻𝑖)
instead of ⪰̂𝑖 (≻̂𝑖) to denote the individual (strict) preference
of a player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. The case A ̸=N, as stated in this paper,
has already been used by Cesco [12] to study some existence
result in many-to-one matching problems.
Definition 1. Anonempty collectionA ⊆N such that {𝑖} ∈ A
for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 is called essential.
Families with such a characteristic have been used by
Kaneko and Wooders [1], Quint [5], and Le Breton et al.
[13] among others to study the existence of core solutions in
games where a restricted family of coalitions determines the
behavior of the whole game. Fromnowon, when dealingwith
a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A), we will assume that the family A
is essential.
A family of coalitions B ⊆ N is balanced if there
exists a collection of positive real numbers (𝜆𝑆)𝑆∈B satisfying∑𝑆∈B
𝑆∋𝑖
𝜆𝑆 = 1, for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. The numbers (𝜆𝑆)𝑆∈B are the
balancing weights for B. B is minimal balanced if there is
no proper balanced subfamily of it. In this case, the set of
balancing weights is unique. A family of essential coalitions is
A-partitionable [1] if and only if the only minimal balanced
subfamilies that it contains are partitions.
Definition 2. Given anonempty family of coalitions𝐹A ⊆N,
I = (I(𝐴))𝐴∈A is anA-distribution if, for each coalition𝐴 ∈
A,I(𝐴) ∈ A andI(𝐴) ⊆ 𝐴. In addition, anA-distribution
is simply called a distribution whenA =N.
Given an A-distribution I, a family B ⊆ A is I-
balanced if the family (I(𝐵))𝐵∈B is balanced.
Definition 3. (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is ordinally balanced if for each bal-
anced family B ⊆ A there is a partition 𝜋 ∈ PA(𝑁) such
that, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜋(𝑖) ⪰̂𝑖𝐵 for some 𝐵 ∈B(𝑖).
Ordinal balancedness is first stated by Bogomolnaia and
Jackson [7] for the caseA =N.
Definition 4. (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is pivotally balanced with respect to an
A-distribution I, if for each I-balanced family B ⊆ A
there is a partition 𝜋 ∈ PA(𝑁) such that, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,𝜋(𝑖)⪰̂𝑖𝐵 for some 𝐵 ∈ B(𝑖). The game is pivotally balanced if
it is pivotally balanced with respect to some A-distribution
I.
This general concept of pivotal balancedness was intro-
duced by Iehle´ [8] for the caseA =N.
Remark 5. Ordinal balancedness implies pivotal balanced-
ness with respect to theA-distributionI = (𝜒𝐴)𝐴∈A, where𝜒𝐴 stands for the indicator vector of the coalition 𝐴, namely,
when 𝜒𝐴 is the 𝑛-dimensional vector with 𝜒𝐴(𝑗) = 1 if player𝑗 belongs to𝐴 and 𝜒𝐴(𝑗) = 0 if player 𝑗 does not belong to𝐴.
The following result is a simple extension of the main
characterization proved by Iehle´ [8, Theorem 3] and whose
proof is carried out in a similar way. However, for the sake of
completeness, we sketch the proof in the Appendix.
Theorem 6 (see Iehle´ [8]). Let (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) be a hedonic game
with A as its family of admissible coalitions. Then, the core
of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is nonempty if and only if the game is pivotally
balanced.
3. Subordinated Games
As a motivation for the content of this section, let us start
with an example which is a slight modification of Game 5 of
Banerjee et al. [6].
Example 7. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game with 𝑁 = {1, 2, 3}
and where the preferences for players 1, 2, and 3 are given in
the three lines below (in this example and in the following
ones as well, we will omit the subscript 𝑖 in the symbol
describing the preference of player 𝑖 to avoid misleading):
{1, 2} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {1} ,
{1, 2} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {2} ,
{3} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {1, 2, 3} .
(1)
Theonly core partition in (𝑁, ⪰) is𝜋 = {{1, 2}, {3}}. According
to Iehle´ [8, Proposition 1], (𝑁, ⪰) is pivotally balanced with
respect to the distributionI given by
I ({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 2} , I ({1, 2}) = {1, 2} ,
I ({1, 3}) = {3} ,
I ({2, 3}) = {3} , I ({𝑖}) = {𝑖} ∀𝑖 = 1, 2, 3.
(2)
The familyA = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}} describes the set of essen-
tially different coalitions in the distribution I. Moreover, if
we consider the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) where ⪰̂ is restriction of ⪰ to
the familyA, namely, if
{1, 2} ≻̂ {1} ,
{1, 2} ≻̂ {2} ,
{3} ⪰̂ {3} ,
(3)
are the restricted preferences for players 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively, then it is easy to check that 𝜋 is also the only core
partition of this game with a restricted family of admissible
coalition.
In this example, the game (𝑁, ⪰) is pivotally balanced
with respect to the family (𝐴), and this family determines
completely the core of the game in the sense that the core of
the reduced game (𝑁, ⪰̂; (𝐴)) coincides with that of (𝑁, ⪰).
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However, as the following example shows, there can be no
relation at all between the core of a hedonic game and the
core of a reduced game related to one of the distributions the
game is pivotally balanced to.
Example 8. Let the (𝑁, ⪰) be a game with𝑁 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
with preferences for players 1, 2, 3, and 4 given by
{1, 2, 3, 4} ≻ {1} ≻ {1, 2} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {1, 4} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
{1, 2, 3, 3} ≻ {2, 3, 4} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {2} ≻ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
{1, 2, 3, 4} ≻ {3, 4} ≻ {3} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {3, 4} ≻ {2, 3, 4} ≻ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
{1, 2, 3, 4} ≻ {3, 4} ≻ {2, 4} ≻ {4} ≻ {1, 2, 4} ≻ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
(4)
respectively. This game is pivotally balanced since 𝜋 ={{1, 2, 3, 4}} is clearly a core partition in (𝑁, ⪰). Moreover,
according to Iehle´ [8, Proposition 1], the game is pivotally
balanced with respect to the distributionI, whereI(𝑆) = 𝑆
for any 𝑆 with |𝑆| < 4 and I({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {1, 2, 3}. In
this case, A coincides with the family of all coalitions with
cardinality less than four. However, in the associated game(𝑁, ⪰̂;A), it is a simple exercise to check that there is a
blocking coalition inA for any of the fifteenA-partitions that
this game have. Therefore, this game has no core partition.
The aim of this section is to explore more deeply these
kind of relationships. To this end we start by defining what
we mean by a subordinated game.
Definition 9. A hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) is subordinated to a
distribution I when, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and any 𝑆 ∈ N(𝑖),
I(𝑆)⪰𝑖𝑆 wheneverI(𝑆) contains player 𝑖.
The game (𝑁, ⪰) in Example 7 is subordinated to the
distributionI showed there.
We point out that, for any given distribution I in a
hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰), the family
A (I) = {𝑆 ∈N : 𝑆 = I (𝑇) for some 𝑇 ∈N} (5)
is an essential family of coalitions since I({𝑖}) = {𝑖}, and
therefore, {𝑖} ∈ A for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.
When subordination is present, the behavior of the
coalitions in a distribution determines, to some extent, the
core of a hedonic game. The next result illustrates this point.
Given a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) and a distribution I, let(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) be the hedonic gamehavingA = A(I) as its family
of admissible coalitions and where ⪰̂ is the restriction of ⪰ to
A.
Theorem 10. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game subordinated to a
distributionI withA = A(I). Then,
(a) the core of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is included in the core of (𝑁, ⪰).
(b) If, for any 𝑆 ∈ N such that 𝑆 ∉ A (𝑆 ̸=I(𝑇) for any𝑇 ⊆ 𝑁),I(𝑆)≻𝑖𝑆
for any 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆), then the core of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is the same as the
core of (𝑁, ⪰).
Proof. Let 𝜋 ∈ 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A). We will show that 𝜋 ∈ 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰)
too. Clearly, there is no 𝑆 ∈ A objecting 𝜋. So, let us assume
that there is 𝑆 ∉ A objecting 𝜋. Then, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, we have
that
𝑆 ≻𝑖 𝜋 (𝑖) . (6)
But, because of subordination,
I (𝑆) ⪰𝑖 𝑆 (7)
for all 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆). Then, for any 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆),
I (𝑆) ≻𝑖 𝜋 (𝑖) , (8)
and since ⪰̂ is the restriction of ⪰ toA, from (8) we get that
I (𝑆) ≻̂𝑖 𝜋 (𝑖) (9)
for all 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆). But this indicates that I(𝑆) objects 𝜋 in(𝑁, ⪰̂;A), a contradiction. Thus, 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) ⊆ 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰).
To see part (b), let us assume that 𝜋 = (𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑠) ∈𝐶(𝑁, ⪰) \ 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A). Then, for at least one 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑠,𝜋𝑗 ∉ A. Let 𝑇 = I(𝜋𝑗). Then, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑇≻𝑖𝜋𝑗.
Thus, 𝑇 is an objection to 𝜋, a contradiction proving that𝐶(𝑁, ⪰) = 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
In general, the reverse inclusion of that stated in (a)
does not hold, mainly because some core partitions in (𝑁, ⪰)
are not A-partitions in (𝑁, ⪰̂;A). On the other hand, we
note that the game in Example 7 is a subordinated game for
which condition (b) ofTheorem 10 holds, which supports the
equality between the core of (𝑁, ⪰) and that of 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
However, in general, the inclusion in (a) of Theorem 10 is
strict as Example 8 shows. Furthermore, the inclusion can be
strict even though the core of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is nonempty.Thenext
example illustrates this point.
Example 11. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game with𝑁 = {1, 2, 3},
and letI be the distribution given by
I ({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 3} , I ({1, 2}) = {1} ,
I ({1, 3}) = {1} ,
I ({2, 3}) = {3} , I ({𝑖}) = {𝑖} for any 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3.
(10)
Then A = A(I) = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 3}}. Let the preference
profile ⪰ in (𝑁, ⪰) have preferences for players 1, 2, and 3
given by
{1} ≻ {1, 2} ⪰ {1, 3} ⪰ {1, 2, 3} ,
{1, 2} ⪰ {2, 3} ⪰ {1, 2, 3} ⪰ {2} ,
{3} ≃ {1, 3} ≃ {2, 3} ⪰ {1, 2, 3} .
(11)
Consequently, the preference profile ⪰̂ defined on A in the
associated game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is
{1} ≻̂ {1, 3} ,
{2} ≃̂ {2} ,
{3} ≃̂ {1, 3} .
(12)
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It is easy to check that the only core partition of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A)
is 𝜋 = ({1}, {2}, {3}). Thus, while 𝜋 is still a core partition in(𝑁, ⪰), it is also simple to check that 𝜋∗ = ({1}, {2, 3}) is a core
partition in (𝑁, ⪰) too.
While condition (b) of Theorem 10 is sufficient for the
coincidence of the cores of (𝑁, ⪰) and (𝑁, ⪰̂;A), respectively,
when subordination is present, the next example shows that
it is not necessary.
Example 12. Let (𝑁, ⪰) andI be like in Example 11. We now
replace the individual preference of player 2 by the following
one:
{2} ≻ {1, 2} ⪰ {2, 3} ⪰ {1, 2, 3} . (13)
Then, although this new game does not satisfy condition (b)
of Theorem 10, it is easy to check that 𝜋 = ({1}, {2}, {3}) is the
only core partition in both games (𝑁, ⪰) and (𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
Finally, when subordination is not present, we can say
nothing about the inclusion stated in part (a) of Theorem 10
as the two games in the next example show.
Example 13. Let us start with the game (𝑁, ⪰) and the same
distribution I used in Example 7. We now modify the
individual preference of player 2 as follows:
{1, 2, 3} ≻ {1, 2} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {2} . (14)
Then the game with preference profile with this new prefer-
ence for player 2 is no longer subordinated to the distribution
I since I({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 2}, but {1, 2} 󳠣 {1, 2, 3} for
player 2. Nevertheless, its only core partition is still 𝜋 ={{1, 2}, {3}}. On the other hand, the associated game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A)
coincides with that of Example 7.Then, its only core partition
is 𝜋 = {{1, 2}, {3}} too, and the inclusion stated in part (a) of
Theorem 10 is verified although subordination is not present.
Now, let𝑁 = {1, 2, 3}, and let (𝑁, ⪰) a hedonic game with
the preferences of players 1, 2, and 3 given by
{1, 2, 3} ≻ {1, 2} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {1} ,
{1, 2, 3} ≻ {1, 2} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {2} ,
{1, 2, 3} ≻ {3} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {2, 3} .
(15)
The only core partition in (𝑁, ⪰) is 𝜋󸀠 = {{1, 2, 3}}. Now, let
I be the same distribution used in Example 7. Again, since
I({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 2} but {1, 2} 󳠣 {1, 2, 3} for player 2, (𝑁, ⪰) is
not subordinated to I. Also, the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is equal to
the corresponding game for the game (𝑁, ⪰) in Example 7, so
its only core partition is 𝜋 = {{1, 2}, {3}}. Then 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is
not included in 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰) in this case.
In the light of Theorem 10, any condition guaranteeing
the nonemptiness of the core of the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) (e.g.,
pivotal balancedness) will be a sufficient condition for the
nonemptiness of the subordinated game (𝑁, ⪰) to I. Thus,
the nonemptiness of the core of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) implies the pivotal
balancedness of (𝑁, ⪰), althoughTheorem 10 does not exhibit
a family A such that the game (𝑁, ⪰) be pivotally balanced
with respectA. However, if we impose on (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) the more
strict condition of ordinal balancedness, then we can also
exhibit, easily, such a distribution.
Proposition 14. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game subordinated
to a distributionI with A = A(I). If (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is ordinally
balanced, then (𝑁, ⪰) is pivotally balanced with respect to the
distributionI.
Proof . LetB be anI-balanced family of coalitions in (𝑁, ⪰). Then, the family {I(𝐵)}𝐵∈B is balanced. Since for each𝐵 ∈ B,I(𝐵) ∈ A, {I(𝐵)}𝐵∈B is also balanced in (𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
Thus, there is an A-partition 𝜋 such that, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,𝜋(𝑖)⪰̂𝑖𝐵󸀠 for some 𝐵󸀠 ∈ {I(𝐵)}𝐵∈B, with 𝐵󸀠 containing player𝑖. However, since (𝑁, ⪰) is subordinated to I, we get that𝜋(𝑖)⪰𝑖I(𝐵)⪰𝑖𝐵 for some 𝐵 ∈B such thatI(𝐵) = 𝐵󸀠.
Corollary 15. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game subordinated to
a distribution I with A = A(I). If A is partitionable then(𝑁, ⪰) is pivotally balanced with respect to the distributionI.
Remark 16. Theorem 10, Proposition 14 and its Corollary 15
are related to a given game (𝑁, ⪰) and a distributionI. Hence
we derive the family A = A(I) of essential coalitions and
the reduced game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A). If we start with a family A of
essential coalitions and (𝑁, ⪰) is now any hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) subordinated to a distribution I such that A = A(I),
those results can be extended to a whole family of games.
The result in Proposition 14 is no longer truewhen ordinal
balancedness for the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is replaced by pivotal
balancedness as Example 17 shows.
Example 17. Let us consider Game 5 of Banerjee et al. [6],
which is the game (𝑁, ⪰) with 𝑁 = {1, 2, 3} and where the
individual preferences for players 1, 2, and 3 are given by
{1, 2} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {1} ,
{1, 2} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {2} ,
{1, 3} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {3} .
(16)
The only core partition in (𝑁, ⪰) is 𝜋 = {{1, 2}, {3}}. If I is
the distribution given by
I ({1, 2, 3}) = {2, 3} , I ({1, 2}) = {1, 2} ,
I ({1, 3}) = {1, 3} ,
I ({2, 3}) = {2, 3} , I ({𝑖}) = {𝑖} ∀𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,
(17)
then A = A(I) = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. The
associated hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is not ordinally balanced.
In fact, the family B = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} is A-balanced.
However, for any 𝜋 ∈ PA(𝑁) in this game, there is always a
player 𝑖 that strictly prefers the worst coalition he belongs to
inB to 𝜋(𝑖). For instance, if 𝜋 = {{3}, {1, 2}}, player 3 strictly
prefers either {1, 3} or {2, 3} to 𝜋(3) = {3}. On the other hand,
it is easy to check that (𝑁, ⪰) is subordinated toA, but, clearly,
it is not pivotally balanced with respect to I. Nevertheless,
since its core is nonempty, it is pivotally balancedwith respect
to another distribution (see [8]).
Even when we do not have much more information
about the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) and consequently we are not
aware whether Proposition 14 applies or not, there is still a
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procedure that can be useful to gather information about the
game (𝑁, ⪰) in many cases.
Definition 18. Given a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) and a distribution
I, we say that a distribution I󸀠 is finer than I if I󸀠(𝑆) ⊆
I(𝑆) for any 𝑆 ∈N.
We point out that when a distribution I satisfies that
I(𝑆) = 𝑆 for all 𝑆, then pivotal balancedness and ordinal
balancedness coincide.
In the next result we are going to use the following
notation. Given a distribution I, for any 𝑆 ∈ N, and for
any natural number 𝑘, let I𝑘(𝑆) = I(I𝑘−1(𝑆)). We agree
in puttingI0(𝑆) = 𝑆.
Lemma 19. Given a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) subordinated to a
distribution I with A = A(I), there is a finer distribution
I󸀠 thanI withI󸀠(I󸀠(𝑆)) = I󸀠(𝑆) for any 𝑆 ∈ N and such
that (𝑁, ⪰) is also subordinated to the distributionI󸀠.
Proof. Since, for any 𝑆 ∈ N,I𝑘(𝑆) ⊆ I𝑘−1(𝑆), there is a first
𝑘󸀠 = 𝑘󸀠(𝑆), 𝑘󸀠 ≥ 1, such thatI𝑘󸀠(𝑆) = I𝑘󸀠−1(𝑆). Now, for any
𝑆 ∈N, we defineI󸀠(𝑆) = I(I𝑘󸀠−1(𝑆)). Then, for any 𝑆 ∈N
we have that
I
󸀠 (I󸀠 (𝑆)) = I󸀠 (I (I𝑘󸀠−1 (𝑆)))
= I󸀠 (I𝑘󸀠 (𝑆))
= I (I𝑘󸀠−1 (𝑆))
= I󸀠 (𝑆) .
(18)
Moreover, for any given 𝑆 ∈N and since the game (𝑁, ⪰)
is subordinated toI, we have that
I
󸀠 (𝑆) ⪰𝑖I𝑘󸀠−1 (𝑆) ⪰𝑖 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⪰𝑖 𝑆, (19)
for any 𝑖 ∈ I󸀠(𝑆), so the game (𝑁, ⪰) is also subordinated to
I󸀠.
In the game of Example 17,I󸀠 = I.
The rationale behind the definition of distribution I󸀠
is that the set of representatives of a coalition 𝑆(I(I(𝑆)))
can also be a set of representatives of 𝑆. What subordination
implies is that if the members of a coalition want to represent
a set of representatives of a coalition 𝑆 (I(I(𝑆))⪰𝑖I(𝑆) for all𝑖 ∈ I(I(𝑆))) then they are willing to represent the coalition𝑆 too. We point out that, since always I(I(𝑆)) ⊆ I(𝑆),
the distribution I󸀠 is endowed with a certain minimality
property. Namely, for any 𝑆 ∈ N, I󸀠(𝑆) is the smaller
set (with respect to inclusion) that it is able to act as
a representative of coalition 𝑆, according to the rules of
selection of representatives prescribed by the distribution
I. Moreover, I󸀠(𝑆) is defined in a unique way. Under
the hypothesis of Lemma 19, we can consider the game(𝑁, ⪰̂;A󸀠) with A󸀠 = A(I󸀠). We note that for any coalition𝑆 ∈ I󸀠 it holds that I󸀠(𝑆) = 𝑆. Thus if (𝑁, ⪰̂;A󸀠) is
ordinally balanced then, because of Proposition 14, (𝑁, ⪰)
is pivotally balanced with respect to the distribution I󸀠.
Therefore, when subordination is present, wether we know
that the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is ordinally balanced or not, there
is still another instance to get information about the core of
the original game through the simpler game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A󸀠). An
interesting example is when the family A󸀠 = {{𝑖} : 𝑖 ∈𝑁}. This case illustrates the situation where each coalition𝑆 is willing to admit a set with only one player as its set of
representatives.Then, according toTheorem 10, the partition𝜋 = {{1}, . . . , {𝑛}} is a core partition in (𝑁, ⪰). Moreover, if for
any 𝑆, |𝑆| > 1, and 𝑖 ∈ I󸀠(𝑆) there is 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑘󸀠(𝑆) such that
I𝑘(𝑆)≻𝑖I𝑘−1(𝑆), then 𝜋 is the only core partition in (𝑁, ⪰),
for in this caseI󸀠(𝑆) ≻𝑖 𝑆 for any 𝑆 ∉ A󸀠, 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆).
Example 8 shows that a game (𝑁, ⪰) can be pivotally
balanced with respect to a distribution I with A = A(I),
while the associated reduced game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is not pivotally
balanced.Thus, in this case, there seems to be no information
in the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) about the core of (𝑁, ⪰). However,
when subordination is present we obtain a positive result.
Definition 20. Given a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰), we say that a
distribution I with A = A(I) is tight if for any partition
𝜋 ∈ P(𝑁) there is a partition 𝜋∗ ∈ PA(𝑁) such that, for any𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜋∗(𝑖)⪰𝑖𝜋(𝑖).
Theorem 21. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game subordinated to
a tight distribution I with A = A(I). Then, the core of(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is nonempty if and only if the core of (𝑁, ⪰) is
nonempty.
Proof. Let us assume first that 𝜋 is a core partition in (𝑁, ⪰).
Since I is tight, there is a partition 𝜋∗ ∈ PA(𝑁) such that𝜋∗(𝑖)⪰𝑖𝜋(𝑖) for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. We claim that 𝜋∗ is a core partition
in 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A). If this was not the case, there would be 𝑆 ∈ A
such that 𝑆⪰𝑖𝜋∗(𝑖) ⪰𝑖𝜋(𝑖) for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, but then 𝑆would block𝜋, a contradiction.
The other implication follows directly from part (a) of
Theorem 10.
Remark 22. From the proof of the latter theorem, it follows
that, when a game (𝑁, ⪰) is pivotally balanced with respect
to a tight distribution I with A = A(I), the pivotal
balancedness of (𝑁, ⪰) always implies that of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
However, when subordination is not present, this condition
is not necessary as the second game in Example 13 illustrates.
On the other hand, Example 8 shows a case of a pivotally
balanced game (𝑁, ⪰)with respect to a distribu tionI, where
the distributionI is not tight and the the associated reduced
game is not pivotally balanced. Thus, without “tightness,”
the pivotal balancedness of a reduced game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is
independent of that of (𝑁, ⪰).
Remark 23. When subordination is present in a game (𝑁, ⪰), for any given partition 𝜋 and any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, I(𝜋(𝑖))⪰𝑖𝜋(𝑖).
However, although I(𝜋(𝑖)), 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛, is an A-family of
mutually exclusive sets, it is not, in general, a partition.Thus,
tightness provides a related but stronger characteristic than
subordination about the game.
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4. Subordination and Other Sufficient
Conditions
Subordination seems to be a strong condition capable of
linking core properties of a hedonic game with core prop-
erties of some of its reduced games constructed based on a
restricted family of coalitions. Many of the games studied in
the literature share the characteristic that its behavior also
depends on particular subfamilies of coalitions. The aim of
this section is to relate some of these games to subordination.
4.1. Consecutive Games. Consecutive games were studied by
Bogomolnaia and Jackson [7]. In order to define them, let𝑁 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛} be a finite set and 𝑓 : 𝑁 → 𝑁 a bijection,
namely, an ordering on 𝑁. A coalition 𝑆 ∈ N is consecutive
with respect to 𝑓 if 𝑓(𝑖) < 𝑓(𝑘) < 𝑓(𝑗) with 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 implies
that 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 too.
Definition 24. A hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) is consecutive if there
is an ordering 𝑓 on𝑁 such that 𝑆⪰𝑖{𝑖} for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 implies
that 𝑆 is consecutive with respect to 𝑓.
Proposition 25. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a consecutive game and 𝑓 an
ordering on𝑁 that makes the game consecutive. Then,
(a) (𝑁, ⪰) is subordinated to the distributionI defined by
I(𝑆) = 𝑆 if 𝑆 is consecutive (with respect to 𝑓) and
I(𝑆) = {𝑖} for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 if 𝑆 is not consecutive.
(b) If A = A(I), the core of (𝑁, ⪰) and the core of(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) coincide.
(c) (𝑁, ⪰) is pivotally balanced with respect to the distri-
butionI.
Proof. (a) ClearlyI(𝑆)⪰𝑖𝑆 for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆when 𝑆 is consecutive.
On the other hand,I(𝑆) = {𝑖}≻𝑖𝑆 when 𝑆 is not consecutive.
Thus, (𝑁, ⪰) is subordinated toI.
(b) SinceA = A(I) = {𝑆 ∈N : 𝑆 is consecutive}, 𝑆 ∉ A
implies that 𝑆 is not consecutive, and thus, I(𝑆)≻𝑖𝑆 for the
unique element 𝑖 ofI(𝑆). Then, condition (b) of Theorem 10
also applies. So, the core of (𝑁, ⪰) is the same as the core of(𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
(c) First we are going to show that (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is ordinally
balanced. LetB ⊆ A be a balanced family of coalitions. From
Greenberg and Weber [14, Proposition 1], it follows that the
family A is partitionable, so (c) follows from Corollary 15.
Remark 26. We point out that part (c) of Proposition 25
has already been proven by Iehle´ [8, Proposition 3]. Iehle´’s
proof and ours are somehow different, but both are based on
Proposition 1 of Greenberg and Weber [14].
4.2. Top-Coalition Property. The top-coalition property [6] is
another well-known condition guaranteeing the existence of
a core partition in a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰). It is also connected
to subordination, as the following result shows.We recall that𝑈 ∈ N is a top coalition of 𝑆 ∈ N if 𝑈 ⊆ 𝑆 and for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈
and 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆 with 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑈⪰𝑖𝑇.
Definition 27. A hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰) satisfies the top-
coalition property if for any coalition 𝑈 ⊆ 𝑁 there is a
top-coalition of 𝑈. One says that a distribution I is a top-
coalition distribution of (𝑁, ⪰) if, for any 𝑆, I(𝑆) is a top-
coalition of 𝑆.
Proposition 28. Let (𝑁, ⪰) be a hedonic game satisfying the
top-coalition property.Then, (𝑁, ⪰) is subordinated to any top-
coalition distributionI.
Proof. It follows directly from the definition ofI.
Many of the examples presented in Banerjee et al. [6,
Section 6] also satisfy the property that the top-coalition
distribution chosen is ordinally balanced. However, unlike
consecutive games, a hedonic game satisfying the top-
coalition property may have core partitions although a top-
coalition distribution is not, for instance, ordinally balanced.
Let us see the following example.
Example 29. Let us consider Game 5 of Banerjee et al. [6]
again (see Example 13) but now with the distribution I
assigningI(𝑆) = 𝑆 for any 𝑆 with |𝑆| < 3 andI({1, 2, 3}) ={1, 2}. Then, I(𝑆) is a top coalition for any 𝑆. However, for
B = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}} there is no partition 𝜋 such that,
for any 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,𝜋(𝑖)⪰𝑖𝐵 for at least one 𝐵 ∈ B, whose
members are elements of the family {I(𝑆)}𝑆⊆𝑁. In fact, any
partition 𝜋 has to contain a coalition with only one element.
For this element 𝑖, it holds that 𝑖 is not ⪰𝑖 for any of the
coalitions of B containing it. Of course, the game is not
pivotally balanced with respect to I either. However, the
game is pivotally balanced with respect to the distributions
I󸀠({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 2}, I󸀠({1, 2}) = {1, 2}, I󸀠({1, 3}) = {3},
I󸀠({2, 3}) = {3},I󸀠({𝑖}) = {𝑖}, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 obtained fromI by
the procedure described by Iehle´ [8, Proposition 3].
4.3. Partitioning Hedonic Games. Hedonic partitioning
games do not seem to have been studied from this
approach before. Our motivation to study them comes
from partitioning games as introduced by Kaneko and
Wooders [1] in the context of cooperative games where a
utility, transferable or not, is present. In addition, we also
introduce this new class of games to have a tool to deal with
matching problems from a game theoretic point of view.
Partitioning games, as Kaneko andWooders [1] show in their
fundamental paper, take the idea that the development of a
game can depend on a restricted familyA of coalitions to the
utmost extreme. Not only the development of a particular
game is completely determined byA but also a whole class of
games related to this family has its development prescribed
by A. In partitioning games, the behavior of any coalition 𝑆
outside the familyA is determined by itsA-partitions.
In order to define a partitioning hedonic game, we start
with a hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) with a restricted family A
of admissible coalitions which we will call the germ of the
partitioning hedonic game. For any 𝑆 ∈ A, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, let
𝛾 (𝑆; 𝑖) = 𝑆, (20)
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and for any 𝑆 ∉ A, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 let
𝛾 (𝑆; 𝑖) = 𝑆∗, (21)
with 𝑆∗ ∈ {𝑇 ∈ A(𝑖) : 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆} satisfying 𝑇⪰̂𝑖𝑆∗ for all 𝑇 ∈ {𝑇 ∈
A(𝑖) : 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆}.
Definition 30. A partitioning hedonic game is a hedonic
game (𝑁, ⪰) for which there exists a germ (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) such that,
for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ⪰𝑖 is defined as:
for any 𝑆, 𝑇 ∈ A (𝑖) , 𝑆 ⪰𝑖 𝑇 iff 𝑆⪰̂𝑖𝑇,
for any 𝑆 ∈ A (𝑖) , 𝑇 ∈N (𝑖)\A, 𝑆 ≻𝑖 𝑇,
for any 𝑆, 𝑇 ∈N (𝑖)\A, 𝑆 ⪰𝑖 𝑇
iff 𝛾 (𝑆; 𝑖) ⪰̂𝑖 𝛾 (𝑇; 𝑖) .
(22)
Let us use (𝑁, ⪰| A) to denote a hedonic partitioning game
with A as its family of essential coalitions. We note that the
associated reduced game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) to the partitioning game(𝑁, ⪰| A) coincides with its germ.
Theorem 31. Let a partitionable essential family of coalitions
A be given. Then, every partitioning hedonic game (𝑁, ⪰| A)
has nonempty core. Moreover, 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰| A) = 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A),
where (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is any germ of (𝑁, ⪰| A).
Proof. Let I be a distribution such that I(𝑆) = 𝑆 for any𝑆 ∈ A, and I(𝑆) ∈ A if 𝑆 ∉ A. Clearly A = A(I). We
claim that (𝑁, ⪰| A) is subordinated to I. In fact, for any𝑆 ∈ A, clearlyI(𝑆) = 𝑆 ⪰𝑖𝑆 for any 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆). And if 𝑆 ∉ A,
I(𝑆)≻𝑖𝑆 for any 𝑖 ∈ I(𝑆) according to the construction of
the preference ≻𝑖. SinceA is partitionable [1] then, according
to Corollary 15, the core of (𝑁, ⪰| A) is nonempty. Moreover,
since condition (b) of Theorem 10 also holds, we have that𝐶(𝑁, ⪰| A) = 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A).
4.4. The Marriage Model. A Nonconstructive Proof of the
Existence of Stable Matchings. As a simple but interesting
consequence ofTheorem 4, we derive a new nonconstructive
(See also [11]) proof about the existence of a stable matching
in the marriage model of Gale and Shapley [2]. To do this, we
first associate a partitioning hedonic game to each marriage
problem. Then, we will show that the core of the game is
related to the set of stable matchings.
The marriage model consists of two finite sets of agents,
the sets 𝑀 of “men” and the set 𝑊 of “women.” It is
assumed that any man 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 is endowed with a preference⪰𝑚 over the set 𝑊 ∪ {𝑚} and that any woman 𝑤 has a
preference ⪰𝑤 on the set 𝑀 ∪ {𝑤}. Individual preferences
are assumed to be reflexive, complete, and transitive on their
corresponding domains. Let us denote by (𝑀,𝑊, ⪰𝑀, ⪰𝑊) a
marriage problem,where⪰𝑀 = (⪰𝑚)𝑚∈𝑀 and⪰𝑊 = (⪰𝑤)𝑤∈𝑊
are the preference profiles corresponding to the men and
women.
Amatching is a function 𝜇 : 𝑀∪𝑊 → 𝑀∪𝑊 satisfying
the following.
(a) For each𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, if 𝜇(𝑚) ̸=𝑚, then 𝜇(𝑚) ∈ 𝑊.
(b) For each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, if 𝜇(𝑤) ̸=𝑤, then 𝜇(𝑤) ∈ 𝑀.
(c) 𝜇(𝜇(𝑘)) = 𝑘 for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝑀 ∪𝑊.
A matching 𝜇 is stable if 𝜇(𝑘)⪰𝑘𝑘 for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝑀 ∪ 𝑊
(individual stability) and if there is no pair 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊
such that 𝜇(𝑚) ̸=𝑤, 𝜇(𝑤) ̸=𝑚, and 𝑤≻𝑚𝜇(𝑚) and 𝑚≻𝑤𝜇(𝑤)
(pairwise stability). The pair (𝑚, 𝑤) is called a blocking pair.
Given a marriage problem (𝑀,𝑊, ⪰𝑀, ⪰𝑊), let us con-
sider the familyA = {𝑆 ⊆ 𝑀 ∪𝑊 : |𝑆| = 2, |𝑆 ∩ 𝑀| ≤ 1, |𝑆 ∩𝑊| ≤ 1}. ClearlyA is essential. Moreover, it is a partitionable
family as follows from the result of Kaneko and Wooders [1]
about the existence of core points for every assignment game
[4].
Given amarriage problem (𝑀,𝑊, ⪰𝑀, ⪰𝑊) let𝑁 = 𝑀∪𝑊
andA as before. To such a problem, we associate the hedonic
game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A) with A as its family of admissible coalitions
where, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ⪰̂𝑖 is defined onA(𝑖) as follows. If 𝑖 = 𝑚
for some𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑆⪰̂𝑖𝑇 if and only if
𝑆 ∩𝑊⪰𝑚𝑇 ∩𝑊 when |𝑆| = |𝑇| = 2,
𝑆 ∩𝑊⪰𝑚𝑚 when |𝑆| = 2 and 𝑇 = 1,
𝑚⪰𝑚𝑇 ∩𝑊 when |𝑆| = 1 and 𝑇 = 2.
If 𝑖 = 𝑤 for some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝑆⪰̂𝑖𝑇 if and only if
𝑆 ∩𝑀⪰𝑚𝑇 ∩𝑀 when |𝑆| = |𝑇| = 2,
𝑆 ∩𝑀⪰𝑚𝑤 when |𝑆| = 2 and 𝑇 = 1,
𝑤⪰𝑚𝑇 ∩𝑀 when |𝑆| = 1 and 𝑇 = 2.
For any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, we also declare that 𝑆⪰𝑖𝑇 when |𝑆| = |𝑇| =1.
With each partition 𝜋 in the game (𝑁, ⪰̂;A), we associate
the matching 𝜇𝜋, where, for each𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝜇𝜋(𝑚) = 𝜋(𝑚) ∩𝑊
if |𝜋(𝑤)| = 2 and 𝜇𝜋(𝑚) = 𝑚 if |𝜋(𝑚)| = 1. Similarly, for each𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝜇𝜋(𝑤) = 𝜋(𝑤) ∩ 𝑊 if |𝜋(𝑤)| = 2 and 𝜇𝜋(𝑤) = 𝑤 if|𝜋(𝑤)| = 1.
Now, we are ready to state the following result.
Theorem 32. Let (𝑀,𝑊, ⪰𝑀, ⪰𝑊) be a marriage problem.
Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the stable
matchings of (𝑀,𝑊, ⪰𝑀, ⪰𝑊) and the core partitions of the
partitioning game (𝑁, ⪰| A) whose germ is (𝑁, ⪰̂;A), the
associated game to the marriage problem. Therefore, the set of
stable matchings of (𝑀,𝑊, ⪰𝑀, ⪰𝑊) is always nonempty.
Proof. From Theorem 31 we have that 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰| A) =𝐶(𝑁, ⪰̂;A) is nonempty.We claim that𝜇𝜋 is a stablematching
for each core partition 𝜋 in (𝑁, ⪰̂;A). To see this, let𝑚 ∈ 𝑀.
If 𝜇𝜋(𝑚) ̸=𝑚, then |𝜋(𝑚)| = 2, and since 𝜋 is a core partition,𝑚 cannot be strictly preferred to 𝜋(𝑚). Thus, 𝜋(𝑚)⪰̂𝑚𝑚, and
according to the definition ⪰̂𝑚 this implies that 𝜋(𝑚) ∩ 𝑊 =𝜇𝜋(𝑚)⪰𝑚𝑚. A similar argument shows that, for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊,𝜇𝜋(𝑤)⪰𝑤𝑤 for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝜇𝜋(𝑤) ̸= 𝑤. Then, 𝜇𝜋 is
individually stable.
On the other hand, let us assume that there is a blocking
pair (𝑚, 𝑤) to 𝜇𝜋. We claim that the coalition 𝑆 = {𝑚,𝑤}
objects the partition 𝜋, leading to a contradiction. Indeed,
from 𝑤≻𝑚𝜇𝜋(𝑚) we get that 𝑆 ∩ 𝑊≻𝑚𝜇𝜋(𝑚) ∩ 𝑊 or,
equivalently, that 𝑆≻̂𝑚𝜋(𝑚) when 𝜇𝜋(𝑚) ̸=𝑚 (|𝜋(𝑚)| = 2).
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We also get that 𝑆≻̂𝑚𝜋(𝑚) when 𝜋(𝑚) = 𝑚 (|𝜋(𝑚)| = 1).
In a similar way we obtain that 𝑚≻𝑤 𝜇𝜋(𝑤) implies that𝑆≻̂𝑤𝜋(𝑤) showing that 𝑆 blocks 𝜋. Thus, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the stablematchings of themarriage
problem and the core partitions of (𝑁, ⪰̂;A)which coincides
with the core of the partitioning game 𝐶(𝑁, ⪰| A).
Remark 33. When all men have identical preferences and
all women have identical preferences as well (Becker [15]
marriage game), Banerjee et al. [6] give an existence result
also generating a hedonic game similar to our partitioning
game. For this particular case they also reach a uniqueness
result.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we introduce the concept of subordination in
hedonic games. It is an appropriate tool to relate the core
partitions of a game with the core partitions of a suitable
derived subgame. We also extend to hedonic games the
notion of partitioning games previously developed in coop-
erative games where a utility is present. We use results about
subordination to show that a particular class of partitioning
hedonic games behave pretty much in the same way as
partitioning games behave in the class of cooperative games
where a utility is present. As an interesting consequence
we derive a new nonconstructive proof of the existence
of stable matchings in the marriage model. Finally, in the
sake of completeness, we present a proof of the existence of
core partitions in hedonic games with a restricted family of
admissible coalitions.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 6 (a sketch). Let 𝜋 be a core partition in(𝑁, ⪰,A). Then the game is pivotally balanced with respect
to any A-distributionI such thatI(𝑆) ⊆ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝜋(𝑖)⪰𝑖𝑆}
(see [8, Proposition 1]).
To see the converse, we will parallel Iehle’s proof of
Theorem 10 of the latter reference.
Let us first take a utility profile for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, namely,
a function 𝑢𝑖 : A(𝑖) → R such that 𝑢𝑖(𝑆) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑇) if and
only if 𝑆 ⪰𝑖 𝑇. Such a utility profile always exists. Now we
construct an𝑁𝑇𝑈-game (𝑁,𝑉;A) with the restricted family
of admissible coalitionsA where, for any 𝑆 ∈ A, 𝑆 ̸=𝑁,
𝑉 (𝑆) = {𝑥 ∈ R𝑛 : 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑖 (𝑆) for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆} , (A.1)
and, if Π is the family of allA-partitions of𝑁,
𝑉 (𝑁) = ⋃
𝜋∈Π
{𝑥 ∈ R𝑛 : 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝜋 (𝑖) for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁} . (A.2)
We now show that if (𝑁, ⪰,A) is pivotally balanced with
respect to an A-distribution I then, for any I-balanced
family of coalitions B ⊆ A, (𝑁, ⪰,A) satisfies a general-
ized version of 𝑏-balancedness [16] for 𝑁𝑇𝑈-games with a
restricted family of coalitions. We claim that this condition
implies that there is 𝑥 ∈ 𝜕𝑉(𝑁) \ int⋃𝑆∈A 𝑉(𝑆) (given a
set 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑅𝑛, 𝜕𝑆 and int 𝑆 stand for the boundary and the
interior of 𝑆, resp.). Such a point 𝑥 is called a core-point in(𝑁,𝑉;A). To prove this claim, we will parallel the first part
of Billera’s proof of Theorem 1 in Billera [16]. We note that,
for any 𝑁 ̸= 𝑆 ∈ A, 𝑉(𝑆) is generated, in the sense indicated
by (A.1), by a unique vector 𝑢𝑆 = (𝑢𝑆𝑖 )𝑖∈𝑁, where 𝑢𝑆𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑆)
if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑢𝑆𝑖 ∈ R if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆. We now construct the matrix𝑀1, with rows indexed by the players in𝑁, and the columns
indexed by themembers ofA\𝑁 andwhose entries are given
by
𝑚1𝑖𝑆 = {𝑢𝑖 (𝑆) if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑀 if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆, (A.3)
where𝑀 is chosen such that𝑀 > 𝑢𝑖(𝑆) for any 𝑁 ̸= 𝑆 ∈ A,𝑖 ∈ 𝑆. On the other hand, let𝑀2 be another matrix with the
same dimension as𝑀1 and whose entries are given by
𝑚1𝑖𝑆 = {1 if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆0 if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆. (A.4)
Namely, the columns of 𝑀2 are the indicator vectors of the
coalitions inA different from𝑁. Since the familyA contains
the individual coalitions and if 𝑚 = |A \ N| (we note that𝑚 ≥ 𝑛), we have that the convex set
{𝑦 ∈ R𝑚 : 𝑦 ≥ 0, 𝑀2𝑦 ≤ 𝜒𝑁} (A.5)
is bounded. So, we can apply a well-known result of Scarf
[17, Theorem 2] to guarantee the existence of a subbasis (A
subbasis for the linear system 𝑀2𝑦 ≤ 𝜒𝑁 is a set 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆𝑘
of linearly independent columns of 𝑀2 for which there is
a vector 𝑦 such that 𝑀2𝑦 ≤ 𝜒𝑁, and 𝑦𝑆 = 0 for any𝑆 ̸= 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆𝑘.) 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆𝑘 for the linear system of inequalities
so that if we define
𝑢𝑖 = min {𝑚1𝑖𝑆𝑗 : 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘}, (A.6)
then for each column 𝑆 of𝑀1 there is a row 𝑖 of𝑀1, satisfying∑𝑚𝑗=1𝑚2𝑖𝑆𝑗𝑦𝑆𝑗 = 1 such that
𝑢𝑖 ≥ 𝑚1𝑖𝑆𝑘 . (A.7)
Therefore, the vector 𝑢 = (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 does not belong to int 𝑉(𝑆)
for any 𝑆 ∈ A \N. If we are able to show that 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉(𝑁),
then any Pareto optimal point 𝑥 ≥ 𝑢 will be a core point
in (𝑁,𝑉;A). To see this, we first note that, by construction,𝑢 ∈ 𝑉(𝑆𝑗) for any 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘. On the other hand, since𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆𝑘 is a subbasis, there is 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑆)𝑆∈A\N such that𝑀2𝑦 ≤ 𝜒𝑁 and 𝑦𝑆 = 0 if 𝑆 ̸= 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆𝑘. We claim that, in
fact, 𝑀2𝑦 = 𝜒𝑁. Then, the subbasis 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆𝑘 contains a
balanced subfamilyB. Since the game (𝑁,𝑉;A) satisfies the
balancedness property and 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉(𝑆) for any 𝑆 ∈ B, we
conclude that 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉(𝑁). We mention that the proof of the
claim is the same given by Billera [16] during the proof of
Theorem 6 for the case that the game is “finitely generated,”
so we omit it here.
To end the proof of the theorem we have to show that the
existence of a core point 𝑥 in (𝑁,𝑉;A) implies the existence
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of a core partition in (𝑁, ⪰;A). Nevertheless, since 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉(𝑁),
there is anA-partition 𝜋 of𝑁 such that 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝜋(𝑖) for any 𝑖 ∈𝑁.We claim that𝜋 is a core partition in (𝑁, ⪰;A). In fact, any
blocking coalition 𝑆 to 𝜋 would imply that 𝑢𝑖(𝑆) > 𝑢𝑖(𝜋(𝑖)) ≥𝑥𝑖 for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 and thus that 𝑥 ∈ int𝑉(𝑆), a contradiction.
Remark 34. The proof of the existence of a core point given
previously for a particular case of “finitely generated” 𝑁𝑇𝑈
game with a restricted family of admissible coalitions can be
extended, with minor modifications, to the general case of
a “finitely generated” 𝑁𝑇𝑈 game and later, following Billera
[16], to a general𝑁𝑇𝑈 game (𝑁,𝑉;A)with a restricted family
of admissible coalitions.
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